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GENDER-BASED WAR CRIMES: INCIDENCE AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
INTRODUCTION
War crimes and international law present legal questions of
jurisdiction, precedent, and lack of authority. These questions have
plagued every historical attempt to prosecute war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Unfortunately, such crimes are among
the largest scale and most devastating of all criminal acts.' There-
fore, it is important to determine how to most effectively prosecute
such crimes.2
Specifically, which type of prosecution can accomplish the goals
of criminal liability most fully? Those goals include deterrence (both
general and specific), retribution, and victim vindication.3 A variety
of war crimes prosecutions have achieved varying degrees of
success. The first such prosecution came after the horrors of the
Holocaust and World War II, resulting in the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials.4 After the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the United Nations authorized the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia5 and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,6 respectively. Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have pushed to create people's
tribunals.7 The United Nations recently established the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC).' Though these efforts have resulted in
1. See Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The
Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 540-41 (2005) ("The prevailing
paradigm views mass atrocity as something greater than the sum of its parts ....
[Miass violence is constructed as something extraordinarily transgressive of universal
norms.... Acts of atrocity are characterized as crimes against the world community or,
more emotively, as offenses against us all.").
2. See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 7 (2001) ("[The] stigmatization of
criminal conduct may have far-reaching consequences, promoting postconflict recon-
ciliation and changing the broader rules of international relations and legitimacy.").
3. See Lynnette S. Cobun, The Insanity Defense: Effects of Abolition Unsupported
by a Moral Consensus, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 471, 476 (1984).
4. Jocelyn Campanaro, Note, Women, War, and International Law: The Historical
Treatment of Gender-Based War Crimes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2557, 2560-64 (2001).
5. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
6. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
7. See infra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (2002).
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considerable progress in the international prosecution of war
crimes, many shortcomings remain.
Part I of this note considers one of the most glaring shortcomings
in the area of war crimes and crimes against humanity: war crimes
disproportionately impacting women, known as gender-based war
crimes. 9 Prosecuting these crimes is particularly difficult when no
established rules, schedules, or procedures exist, which unfortunately
has been true of previous international war crimes prosecutions."°
Additionally, these crimes, and particularly their victims, are
typically ignored or marginalized." Despite often being the most
widespread type of war crime committed in any given conflict,
gender-based war crimes are often the most overlooked. 2 The estab-
lishment of the ICC may potentially alleviate many of these obsta-
cles, thus making prosecution of gender-based war crimes more likely
and more effective. The United States' failure to ratify the Rome
Statute, the formative treaty of the ICC," directly hinders the poten-
tial of the ICC in the prosecution of gender-based war crimes.
Part II of this note examines the boundaries of international
criminal prosecution today and the definitions of gender-based war
crimes. Such boundaries and definitions are blurred and evolving
but still necessary to frame the argument. Part III examines the
nature and effectiveness of ad hoc tribunals. To date, ad hoc
tribunals have been the most common method for prosecuting war
criminals internationally. 4 These tribunals have had varied success
prosecuting gender-based war crimes. Part III is divided into two
9. Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2557-58:
In times of war, women and girls are targeted for sexual abuse on the basis
of their gender, irrespective of their age, ethnicity, or political affiliation.
By virtue of their gender, women become the target of one of the most
serious violations that occur during war.... Although there are a broad
range of gender-based war crimes, each crime possesses a common element
- women are exclusively or disproportionately the victims.
See also Peggy Kuo, Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence in an International
Tribunal, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 305, 321 (2002) ("Crimes against women are also
crimes against all humanity.").
10. Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2559-65.
11. See, e.g., John Simpson, War Crimes-Have We LearnedAnything?, BBC NEWS,
Apr. 20, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4456043.stm (noting that it has only
been "11 years since Rwanda, and 10 since the Bosnian Serb general, Ratko Mladic,
ordered the murder of every male Muslim in Srebrenica. And [yet,] in Darfur people are
dying right now").
12. Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2561.
13. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, U.S. Resolution on World Court Revives Hostility,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2003, at A4 (noting "Vashington's concerns that its troops could
fall prey to frivolous politically motivated prosecutions").
14. See, e.g., Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2569.
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subsections - international criminal tribunals and people's tri-
bunals. Both are types of ad hoc tribunals that have been recently
implemented. The successes and failures of each are examined in
terms of their contribution to the goals of international criminal
prosecution of war crimes. Part IV discusses the newly formed ICC.
It examines what the ICC is designed to do and how it intends to
prosecute war criminals. Part IV argues that, though still in its
infancy, the ICC poses the greatest possibility of success in accom-
plishing the goals of international criminal prosecution and that,
most importantly, the ICC may be able to deter the occurrence of
future gender-based war crimes. Part IV further argues that the
United States' failure to join the ICC will directly hinder the Court's
potential success.
I. GENDER-BASED WAR CRIMES
Gender-based war crimes have long been recognized in some
form.'" Historically, however, prosecution has focused neither on
criminal liability nor the crimes' real victims. 6 For example:
For centuries, wartime rape of women was considered an
inevitable consequence of war, necessary to boost soldiers'
morale, and was lumped together with property crimes. Later,
rape was considered a crime against family honor. Not until the
last half century was rape understood to be an offense against
the woman, against her dignity, instead of against her family's
or her husband's honor.'
Understanding and recognizing rape (and other gender-based war
crimes) as a war crime against each victim is not sufficient; these
crimes must also be defined.
The nature of international war crimes prosecution, including
the lack of established rules or precedent, makes ascertaining
precise definitions of many of the crimes and their elements
15. See, e.g., id. at 2558; Kuo, supra note 9, at 305-06; Julie Mertus, Book Note, 93
AM. J. INTL LAw 740, 741 (1999) (reviewing KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST
WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (1997)) ("[R]ape has
long been considered a punishable violation of the customs of war.").
16. KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTER-
NATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 28 (1997); Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for
Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 16 BYUJ. PUB. L. 317, 317-18 (2002).
17. Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 16, at 317.
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difficult.' 8 Currently, international tribunals have the authority to
prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 9 violations
of the laws or customs of war,2° crimes against humanity,2' and
genocide.22 Fortunately, this rather limited list can encompass a
wide variety of crimes, including gender-based crimes, given that
the definitions are not concrete.23
Today, gender-based crimes include, but are not limited to, rape,
sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy/childbirth, and
forced sterilization. 24 Gender-based war crimes require particular-
ized evaluation because the crimes are both distinct from other war
18. Definitions must be generally recognized and accepted by a majority of countries
before it is possible to prosecute them internationally. See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin,
Developments in International Criminal Law: Sexual Violence in Decisions and
Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM. J. INTL
L. 97, 109 (1999) ("Rape and other forms of sexual violence have never been defined
under international law . ").
19. Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2566-67.
20. Id. at 2560, 2588.
21. Id. at 2560-61, 2589. Crimes against humanity are generally considered to
include "any of the following crimes committed as part of a widespread of systematic
attack against a civilian population: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution on political, racial or religious grounds, or
other inhumane acts." Askin, supra note 18, at 97 n.5.
22. There are some general definitions of the crimes that can be prosecuted by
international tribunals as genocide. The Genocide Convention defines genocide to mean:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing
members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 11,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
23. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 731 (Feb. 9,
1998) ('These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women,
their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the
process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing
to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole."). See also
Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2566-67 (explaining that though gender-based war crimes
are not specifically listed as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, they are
included within supporting and explanatory articles of the Conventions).
24. Askin, supra note 18, at 107. For example, in the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, gender-based crimes included in the record (though not charged
as such) were "gang rape, public rape, multiple instances of rape, rape with foreign
objects, rape of girl-children as young as six years of age, forced nudity, forced abortion,
forced marriage, forced miscarriage, rapes specifically intended to humiliate, sexual
slavery, forced prostitution, sexual torture and sexual enslavement." Id. (footnote
omitted).
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crimes and typically ignored in post-conflict situations." Often,
these crimes are widespread, organized, and implemented by the
ruling or rebelling regime.2" "[S]ystematic gender-specific crimes,
including sexual assault, 'genocidal rape,' and forced impregnation
routinely occur during armed conflicts. Indeed, one commentator
has described sexual violence toward women as a veritable 'tool of
war."'27 Furthermore, gender-based war crimes are often particu-
larly egregious and numerous during ethnic cleansing,2" as ruling
or rebelling ethnic groups may attempt to impregnate women with
children of a certain ethnic group or force abortions of children from
a particular ethnic group.29
25. See, e.g., Stephanie K Wood, A Woman Scorned for the ' least Condemned" War
Crime: Precedent and Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious War Crime in the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 274, 275 (2004).
26. See, e.g., 'Systematic Rape' in Sierra Leone War, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/2662807.stm.
27. Angela M. Higgins, Comment, "Else We Are Condemned to Go from Darkness to
Darkness" Victims of Gender-Based War Crimes and the Need for Civil Redress in U.S.
Courts, 70 UMKC L. REV. 677, 679 (2002) ("Though the traditional notion of rape in
wartime suggests that rape is perpetrated by men in the heat of battle and its after-
math, close study of recent armed conflicts proves that rape is a systematic, deliberate
weapon of war.").
28. For reference to the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, see
Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2569-70:
While rape has historically been used as a weapon of war to terrify,
humiliate, degrade, destroy, and subordinate, the rapes committed during
these conflicts took things one step further - they were committed as part
of a deliberate system of ethnic cleansing. Women were subjected to
horrifying and violent sexual abuses, often committed at the hands of men
they or their families knew. These inexcusable violations were inflicted as
'an official policy of war," a policy that sought to get rid of an "unwanted"
group. In both conflicts, women were the vehicles utilized to humiliate,
subordinate, or emotionally destroy entire communities; to cause chaos and
terror; to make people flee; and to ensure the destruction or removal of an
unwanted group by forcible impregnation by a member of a different ethnic
group. These sexual assaults were committed as a method of ethnic
cleansing of the regions and occurred with unabashed regularity ....
(footnotes omitted).
29. Id. at 2571:
Women were often held in 'rape camps' or detention centers for months and
suffered numerous and appalling sexual violations in hope that they would
become impregnated and carry a Serbian child. Under Islamic and Muslim
law, a child's ethnicity is determined by that of the father, so children born
of these sexual assaults, committed by the Serb men, would not be
considered Muslim or of their mother's ethnicity. Thus, rape was a
mechanism to eliminate an entire population and replace it with a Serbian
one.
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See also Higgins, supra note 27, at 679 ("Armed
forces rape for the express purpose of humiliating and demoralizing subjected peoples, and
to eliminate opposing groups through rape-related injuries or forced impregnation."
(footnotes omitted)).
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II. AD Hoc TRIBUNALS
Ad hoc tribunals are one of the most prominent and common
types of international criminal prosecution of war crimes. ° After a
conflict, tribunals are organized and held to prosecute the crimes
stemming from that particular conflict.3 ' The tribunals are often
successful in prosecuting these crimes and can be an effective
deterrent against continued violence or retaliation from the parties
involved.32 Unfortunately, ad hoc tribunals tend to ignore or
minimize gender-based war crimes (whether consciously or as a
result of procedural shortcomings) and are largely ineffective for
general deterrence of war crimes.33
A. International Criminal Tribunals
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides for the
handling of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression."'  In May 1993, the United Nations interpreted the
Chapter's authority to create the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).35 The tribunal's formative statute
describes the crimes the ICTY can prosecute in articles two through
five.3" Significantly, the ICTY Statute also specifies that jurisdiction
is granted and based on criminal responsibility for both "individual
culpability and superior authority. ' 37 The ICTY is charged with
prosecuting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations
of laws and customs of war, charges of genocide, and crimes against
humanity.3"
The ICTY was created to prosecute the war criminals responsi-
ble for the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the former Yugoslavia
30. See, e.g., Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2569. In the last fifty years, high profile
ad hoc international tribunals have existed in Nuremberg, Tokyo, the former
Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. Id. at 2559-86.
31. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
32. Cobun, supra note 3, at 477.
33. Tina R. Karkera, Comment, The International Criminal Court's Protection of
Women: The Hands of Justice at Work, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 197, 202
(2003).
34. U.N. Charter art. 39. See generally id. arts. 39-51.
35. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 5.
36. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia arts.
2-5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
37. Id. art. 7 (addressing "[i]ndividual criminal responsibility").
38. Id. arts. 2-5.
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in the late 1980s and 1990s.39 Ethnic tension had been building
since World War II, when Dictator Josip Tito unified the six
republics of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia, and Montenegro into the nation of Yugoslavia.4 ° After
Tito's death in 1980 and the fall of the Soviet Union, tensions
reached a breaking point.4 The leaders of Yugoslavia ignited
conflict between Serbs, Muslims, Croats, and Jews.42 Slobodan
Milosevic became the leader of the Serbian Communist Party in
1986 under a platform of promoting Serbian nationalism and
dominance.4" This led to declarations of independence by Croatia
and Slovenia in 1991 and escalating violence.44 Bosnia-Herzegovina
followed suit by declaring independence in 1992. 4 Bosnian Serbs
declared themselves the independent Serbian Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina under Radovan Karadzic.46 The Bosnian Serbs
initiated attacks against the Croats and Muslims of Bosnia.47 Non-
Serbs were subjected to military attacks, internment, interrogation,
and torture.4" Gender-based war crimes also occurred during the
conflict, including rape, forced sterilization, and forced pregnancy
and childbirth.49 Specifically:
39. Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2572. For background material on the conflict, see
generally RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To ENDAWAR (1999); CAROLE ROGEL, THE BREAKUP OF
YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS AFTERMATH (2004); LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA:
DEATH OF A NATION (1997).
40. 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 18 (1995).
41. Id.
42. See Akhavan, supra note 2, at 10.
43. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 40, at 19.
44. Id.
45. Id. (recognizing that Muslims and Croats voted for independence while Bosnian
Serbs boycotted the referendum).
46. Id. at 19-20.
47. Id. at 20.
48. See Akhavan, supra note 2, at 10-11.
49. See Higgins, supra note 27, at 695-96. See also Karina Michael Waller, Intra-
state Ethnic Conflicts and International Law: How the Rise of Intrastate Ethnic
Conflicts Has Rendered International Human Rights Laws Ineffective, Especially
Regarding Sex-Based Crimes, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 621, 639-40 (2001):
The act of rape as seen during the Yugoslav war was also a form of
genocide, orchestrated by the combatants to not only humiliate and
degrade, but to impregnate in order to destroy ethnicity. During the war,
international human rights organizations learned that rape was occurring
on a regular basis by factions on all sides as a weapon of war. Serb armies
in particular regularly used rape as a strategy of war, both as an attempt
to ethnically cleanse certain areas, and to assert Serb domination. Bosnian
Muslim women were often taken to warehouses and raped repeatedly.
(footnotes omitted).
506 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 12:499
Sexual terrorism against women during armed conflict has
perhaps never been more egregious nor more deliberate than in
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Rape was "an official
policy of war" in the ethnic fighting. As a tactic of intimidation
and terror, Serbian forces raped Muslim women to humiliate
and demoralize them and their communities.... Serbians used
rape to "pollute and water down" the bloodline of their enemies.
Serbian aggressors held their female victims captive in "rape
camps" for months, until they were confirmed to be pregnant
and it was too late to abort the fetuses, in an effort to "wipe out
the Muslim blood" of their enemies by forcing them to bear
Serbian children.50
The extensive nature of the war crimes, particularly the gender-
based war crimes, presented a significant task for the ICTY, which
may partially account for its shortcomings.5 Not only was the ICTY
created under what many considered the questionable authority of
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, but it was also quickly plagued by
procedural problems.52 The tribunal had virtually no operating
budget with which to start working.53 Lack of funding as well as
lack of experience and precedent made staffing the ICTY difficult. 4
In the end, it took several years to get the tribunal organized and
operational.55 Even once operational, the tribunal had no precedent
upon which to rely, no lower courts to look to, and no superior
courts to review its decisions.56
See generally Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former
Yugoslavia and the Failure of the International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the
Injuries, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 793 (1997).
50. See Higgins, supra note 27, at 695-96.
51. Kate Nahapetian, Note, Selective Justice: Prosecuting Rape in the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 14 BERKELEYWOMEN'S L.J.
126, 129-30 (1999) ("According to the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, as many
as 20,000 women were raped in the former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1994.").
52. Richard J. Goldstone, The Institute for Global Legal Studies Inaugural Collo-
quium: The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: The Role of the United Nations in
the Prosecution of International War Criminals, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 119, 122-23
(2001) (detailing such procedural difficulties including problems finding and approving
a person for the position of Chief Prosecutor, lack of funding, and lack of established
precedent).
53. Id. at 122.
54. Id. at 123.
55. Id. See also Waller, supra note 49, at 652 (noting that by December 1999, the
ICTY had tried and convicted only six defendants).
56. Patricia M. Wald, The Institute for Global Legal Studies Inaugural Colloquium:
The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: The International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of
an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 87, 114 (2001).
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In addition to procedural problems specific to the ICTY, impe-
diments have arisen that are specific to the nature of gender-based
war crimes.5 7 Despite the fact that "[v]ictim-witnesses are the soul
of war crimes trials at the ICTY,"5" their involvement presents
many challenges. These witnesses are critical to the conviction of
war criminals, since there is purposely little other evidence (such
as a paper trail) of the war crimes committed. 9 Nonetheless, many
factors contribute to the difficulty these victim-witnesses face in
actually testifying.6 0 Many of the approximately 1000 victim-
witnesses who have testified to date have had to travel to The
Hague from wherever they had relocated, often as refugees, after
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.6 Those who remain in the
former Yugoslavia "still reside in the areas where the war crimes
took place and their fear of intimidation and retaliation by friends,
family, or allies of the defendants is often real."62 The threats per-
ceived by victim-witnesses stem not only from their experiences
during the conflict, but also from the fact that many of the war
criminals or their families still live in the same communities as
their victims.63
The tribunal is able to offer victim-witnesses some protection.64
Nonetheless, those protections cannot necessarily overcome the
fear, frustration, and impatience with the system that many victim-
witnesses feel. 5 Furthermore, with the passage of time memories
fade, and preferring to put the past behind them, some victim-
witnesses become less willing to testify.66 Finally, victims of gender-
based crimes may feel a particular reluctance to testify as a result
57. Id. at 107.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Kuo, supra note 9, at 317-19.
61. Wald, supra note 56, at 108.
62. Id. at 108-09.
63. Id.; Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2575 ("Under the current rules, witnesses are
only protected during criminal proceedings and are offered little, if any, protection
afterwards. Many of the women testifying return to small villages where, in some cases,
their assailants still live." (citation omitted)).
64. Wald, supra note 56, at 109:
A large percentage of witnesses in ICTY trials ask for and get some type of
protection ranging from: (1) non-disclosure of their identity to the media or
in the public record; (2) court orders to defense counsel to keep a log and
notify the prosecutor of all contacts with witnesses; (3) facial and voice
distortion of the witness on camera since the proceedings are televised to
the Balkans; and (4) in extreme cases taking testimony in closed session
which will not appear in the public transcripts.
See also Kuo, supra note 9, at 317-18.
65. Wald, supra note 56, at 109.
66. Id.
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of previous ICTY rulings.67 The tribunal has decided not to offer any
privilege for the medical records of the victims, including records of
psychological counseling. 8
Despite these problems, the ICTY has not been completely
ineffective in prosecuting gender-based war crimes.6 9 "At least half
of the public indictments in the ICTY have brought charges, either
separately or in connection with other charges, alleging some form
of gender-based violence, particularly sexual violence." 70 One such
indictment resulting in a conviction was that of Serbian Dusko
Tadic.71 Tadic was charged with violations of the laws or customs of
war 72 and crimes against humanity.73 These charges stemmed from
Tadic's participation in (or tacit consent to) crimes that occurred at
the Omarska camp where Bosnian Muslims and Croats were forced
to live. 74 The crimes against humanity included gang rape, sexual
assault, and humiliation.75 "Tadic was expected to be the first inter-
national war crimes trial in history to prosecute rape separately as
a war crime, and not solely in conjunction with other crimes." In
later ICTY indictments, gender-based war crimes were specifically
included, and rape was recognized as a form of torture.77
67. Id. at 107. See also Askin, supra note 18, at 111-12.
68. See Wald, supra note 56, at 107.
69. Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2573 ("[The work of the ICTY has resulted in a
number of legal and procedural advances in the recognition and prosecution of gender-
based crimes."). See generally RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY (2004)
(giving an overall assessment of the successes of the ICTY).
70. Askin, supra note 18, at 99-100.
71. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Indictment (Amended) (Dec. 14, 1995).
For a discussion of the impact, successes, and failures of the ICTY after the conviction
of Dusko Tadic, see Kitty Felde et al., War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the
Prospects: The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1441 (1998).
72. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, at counts 3, 6, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 30, 33.
73. Id. at counts 1, 4, 7, 11, 14, 17, 20, 22, 26, 28, 31, 34.
74. Id. 2.2-2.5.
75. Id. 4.3.
76. Askin, supra note 18, at 101 (explaining that although indicted as such, the
independent rape charge was withdrawn during the trial because the witness was
afraid to testify). See also Kuo, supra note 9, at 314-18 (providing a first-hand account
of the Kunarac trial); Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2580-81 (revealing that in 1996, the
indictment of Serbian Commander Dragoljub Kunarac included independent rape
charges as crimes against humanity and resulted in a 2001 guilty conviction).
77. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, 67 (July
21, 2000). See also Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 452 (1999) (noting the importance of the conviction of Anto
Furundzija, which included rape as a violation of the customs of war); Campanaro,
supra note 4, at 2578-79 (including the indictments of Furundzija and those related to
the Celebici prison camp); Nahapetian, supra note 51, at 131-32 (characterizing
Furundzija's conviction as the first war crimes conviction based solely on rape, and
noting that it was based on command theory).
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Procedural advances were also achieved in the prosecution of
gender-based war crimes during the ICTY.78 The tribunal estab-
lished several rules to facilitate testimony by victims.79 Victims'
prior sexual history and conduct are not admissible, and consent is
not a defense if the victim perceived a threat.8 ° Additionally, victim
testimony need not be corroborated."' Specifically, the tribunal
ruled that any relevant evidence having probative value, as long as
it is not overly prejudicial, is admissible.8 2 This ruling is particu-
larly important for gender-based war crimes, given the difficulties
of getting even one victim-witness to testify. The tribunal declared
that this ruling "accords to the testimony of a victim of sexual
assault the same presumption of reliability as the testimony of
victims of other crimes, something long denied to victims of sexual
assault by the common law." '
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was
established in much the same way as the ICTY."5 This ad hoc
tribunal was established after the brutal killing of ten to fifteen
percent of the population of Rwanda in less than three months in
1994.86 The genocide was highly organized and efficient, perpe-
trated by the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority. 7 Gender-
based war crimes included rape, forced pregnancy, forced childbirth,
and forced abortion." The problems that plagued the establishment
78. Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2574.
79. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.
Doc. IT/32/Rev.36 R. EVID. 90 (1995), available at http://www.un.orglicty/legaldoc-e/
index.htm (follow "Basic Legal Documents"; "Rules of Procedure and Evidence"; "Rules
of Procedure and Evidence rev. 36").
80. Id.; Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2574.
81. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.
Doc. IT/32/Rev.36 R. EVID. 90 (1995), available at http://www.un.org/ictyflegaldoc-e/
index.htm (follow "Basic Legal Documents"; "Rules of Procedure and Evidence"; "Rules
of Procedure and Evidence rev. 36") at R. EVID. 96(i).
82. Id. at R. EVID. 89(C).
83. See Wald, supra note 56, at 108-09.
84. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 536 (May 7,
1995).
85. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 6, art. 14.
86. For an overview of the Rwandan genocide, see LT. GEN. RoMtO DALLAIRE, SHAKE
HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004); ALISON DES
FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999); PHILIP
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998); LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE
RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2004).
87. See, e.g., Jean Marie Kamatali, Freedom of Expression and Its Limitations: The
Case of the Rwandan Genocide, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 68 (2002).
88. See Higgins, supra note 27, at 698. See also Wood, supra note 25, at 274-75:
The 1994 Rwanda Genocide had devastating effects on the female
population in the country due to the systematic gender-based violence
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and legitimacy of the ICTY similarly plagued the ICTR."9 The issues
surrounding victim-witnesses were also similar, including delays,
problems of traveling to the tribunal, release of victims' medical
records, and the disclosure of victims' identities to defendants who
often had the ability to seek revenge.90
Nevertheless, important distinctions exist between the two,
distinctions that generally facilitate the prosecution of gender-based
war crimes.9' Most importantly, the conflict and ethnic cleansing
that occurred in Rwanda was an intra-state conflict, as differenti-
ated from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which had both
intra- and inter-state elements. 92 The United Nations Security
Council convened a tribunal over the objection of Rwanda. 93 This
was possible because the ICTY had been established six months
prior, creating a precedent for interpreting Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter to allow for an international criminal tribunal.94
The trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu 95 demonstrates both the ad-
vances and the hurdles facing international prosecution of gender-
based war crimes.' Akayesu was responsible for controlling the
police and maintaining public order at a commune where Tutsis were
forced to live during the Rwandan genocide. 97 Initially, Akayesu was
on trial for genocide, and gender-based war crimes were not explicitly
included in his indictment for those crimes.9 During the course of the
trial, however, witnesses testified about rape, and reports confirmed
that testimony.99 Subsequent to further investigation, the prosecutors
endorsed and carried out by government officials. Almost one million
people were killed in one hundred days and.., nearly all female survivors
- including many young girls - were raped and sexually brutalized.
(footnotes omitted).
89. See, e.g., G6ran Sluiter, The ICTR and the Protection of Witnesses, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 962, 962-76 (2005) (noting that, in particular, both courts encountered
difficulties "in obtaining testimonial evidence").
90. See Goldstone, supra note 52, at 123-24.
91. See Wood, supra note 25, at 275 ("TIhe ICTR's efforts in prosecuting gender-
based violence as crimes against humanity and tools of genocide have been unpre-
cedented.").
92. Akhavan, supra note 2, at 11; Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2582-83. See also
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 40, at 20 (noting that several republics had declared
independence from Yugoslavia during the conflict and were recognized as independent
by the United Nations).
93. See Goldstone, supra note 52, at 121.
94. Id.
95. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Feb. 9, 1998).
96. See Askin, supra note 18, at 105-06. See also Nahapetian, supra note 51, at 133
(observing that this trial, the first at the ICTR to include gender-based war crimes
charges, did not begin until three years after the ICTR was formed).
97. Askin, supra note 18, at 106.
98. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 12.
99. See, e.g., Askin, supra note 18, at 105-07; Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2583.
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amended the charges against Akayesu to include gender-based
war crimes, specifically sexual violence,10 as an element of the
genocide.101 Akayesu was later convicted of genocide, including crim-
inal liability for knowledge and facilitation of the sexual violence
taking place at the commune,0 2 the first such conviction in history.
The trial and conviction of Akayesu by the ICTR represents
both progress and continued setbacks in the prosecution of gender-
based war crimes. It is significant that the tribunal was convened
as a result of an intra-state conflict as it demonstrates an interna-
tional willingness to prosecute war crimes regardless of whether
they are considered international. 13 Unfortunately, there was not
enough initial investigation and recognition of gender-based war
crimes for these charges to be included in the indictment of Akayesu,
but when evidence of such arose, the trial was halted while further
investigation took place.104 Most importantly, the tribunal recognized
the connection between gender-based crimes, particularly sexual
violence, and genocide itself.05 Furthermore, Akayesu was convicted
of knowing about and facilitating the sexual violence, despite insuf-
ficient evidence that Akayesu personally participated in the physical
acts that led to the charges. 1 6 Attaching criminal liability to actors
such as Akayesu is critical because genocide and war crimes are
often perpetuated by extensive criminal networks that attempt to
protect those at the highest levels by ensuring that they are giving
undocumented orders, rather than carrying out the crimes them-
selves. 1o7
100. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-I, Indictment, 10a (Feb. 13, 1996)
("In this indictment, acts of sexual violence include forcible sexual penetration of the
vagina, anus or oral cavity by a penis and/or of the vagina or anus by some other object,
and sexual abuse, such as forced nudity.").
101. Askin, supra note 18, at 106 ('When the trial resumed, extensive testimony
concerning rape and other forms of sexual violence was admitted into evidence. This
evidence was used to establish that sexual violence was a fundamental and integral part
of the genocide committed during the Rwandan conflict."). See also Higgins, supra note
27, at 699.
102. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 731 ('These rapes resulted in physical and
psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual
violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi
women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the
Tutsi group as a whole.").
103. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.").
104. Askin, supra note 18, at 105; Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2583-85.
105. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
106. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 693.
107. See, e.g., Askin, supra note 18, at 106.
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Overall, the ICTY and the ICTR have demonstrated that when
international criminal prosecutions for gender-based war crimes
take place, even as part of broader war crimes prosecutions, they
can result in significant convictions. 1°' These prosecutions are also
largely viewed as having been fair and effective." 9 To a certain
extent, victims are able to testify and gain vindication." 0 The
overriding problem, however, is that these tribunals are isolated
and ad hoc."' Ad hoc tribunals are, by design, conflict specific, and
to an extent they can serve to prevent conflict from breaking out
again in the area in which the tribunal operates." 2 They can also
paralyze leaders and rebels who might otherwise attempt to return
to power or resume the conflict."' This function is particularly
important in war-torn areas where there is likely no other instru-
ment for stopping war criminals. 1 4 Thus, though these tribunals
can be effective in deterring further war crimes during a given
conflict, they offer less of a general deterrent effect for future
conflicts." 5
B. People's Tribunals
In December of 2000, the Women's International War Crimes
Tribunal 2000 convened in Tokyo, Japan. n 6 The tribunal was
108. See Akhavan, supra note 2, at 9.
109. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 52, at 124-25 (noting that, in the author's
opinion, the tribunals' "most important success is the demonstration that international
courts can hold fair trials").
110. See Wald, supra note 56, at 109.
111. Id. at 114.
112. Akhavan notes:
The empirical evidence suggests that the ICTY and the ICTR have
significantly contributed to peace building in postwar societies, as well as
to introducing criminal accountability into the culture of international
relations. Both institutions have helped to marginalize nationalist political
leaders and other forces allied to ethnic war and genocide, to discourage
vengeance by victim groups, and to transform criminal justice into an
important element of the contemporary international agenda.
Akhavan, supra note 2, at 9.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 7-8 (noting that the more often criminal prosecution of war crimes takes
place, the more "the preventive effects of international criminal justice can extend
beyond postconflict peace building in directly affected countries. The prosecution and
related political demise of such leaders sends a message that the cost of ethnic hatred
and violence as an instrument of power outweighs its benefits."). See generally Mary
Margaret Penrose, Note, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International
Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 321 (2000).
116. See, e.g., Christine M. Chinkin, Women's International Tribunal on Japanese
Military Sexual Slavery, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 335 (2001).
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"established to consider the criminal liability of leading high-
ranking Japanese military and political officials and the separate
responsibility of the state of Japan for rape and sexual slavery as
crimes against humanity arising out of Japanese military activity
in the Asia Pacific region in the 1930s and 1940s." 7 Specifically,
the rape and sexual slavery occurred at the numerous "comfort
facilities" established for the "recreation" of Japanese military
forces during World War II.11s Women were forced and coerced from
their homes throughout Southeast Asia into the sexual slavery of
the comfort facilities." 9 The Japanese government has denied
responsibility for the formation and use of the comfort facilities. 120
For decades, the victims of the comfort facilities, many of whom
suffered permanent physical and emotional injuries, remained
silent. 121
The virtual silence on the issue of comfort stations and gender-
based war crimes that occurred during World War II ended in the
late 1980s. 122 NGOs proved instrumental in exposing the comfort
stations, and their efforts resulted in the Women's International
War Crimes Tribunal 2000.123 The tribunal assessed the criminal
liability of the state of Japan and specifically Emperor Hirohito as
head of state. 124 After the panel of judges heard the evidence, the
state of Japan and Emperor Hirohito were "convicted" of gender-
based war crimes perpetrated against 200,000 women during World
War 11.125
Though this would appear to be a resounding success for the
movement to criminally prosecute gender-based war crimes, upon
117. Id.
118. Higgins, supra note 27, at 681-82 ("Conditions in these 'comfort stations' were
appallingly cruel. Young women, an estimated eighty percent of whom were between
the ages of fourteen and eighteen, were forcibly confined and repeatedly raped by as
many as seventy men a day. Women who resisted were beaten, stabbed, and murdered;
many committed suicide." (internal citations omitted)).
119. Id. at 681.
120. See Chinkin, supra note 116, at 335. See also Sue R. Lee, Comment, Comforting
the Comfort Women: Who Can Make Japan Pay?, 24 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 509, 510
(2003) ("For years, Japan was able to sustain this lie because it had destroyed or
concealed evidence that would reveal the truth.").
121. See Lee, supra note 120, at 519. See also Higgins, supra note 27, at 681-82.
122. See Chinkin, supra note 116, at 336 (noting that war crimes were prosecuted
after World War II, but gender-based war crimes were largely ignored in those
proceedings); Higgins, supra note 27, at 699 ("The International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (IMTFE), established to prosecute Japanese war crimes during World War
II, failed to address one of the worst and largest-scale instances of war crimes against
women in known history, the atrocities visited upon the 'comfort women.").
123. Chinkin, supra note 116, at 336.
124. Id. at 338; see Higgins, supra note 27, at 681-82.
125. See, e.g., Chinkin, supra note 116, at 338; Higgins, supra note 27, at 682.
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closer inspection the convictions were a rather hollow victory.
"Peoples' tribunals [such as the Women's International War Crimes
Tribunal 2000] are premised on the understanding that 'law is an
instrument of civil society' that does not belong to governments ....
Accordingly, when states fail to exercise their obligations to ensure
justice, civil society can and should step in."'26 That is a commend-
able position, but the downside is that "[t]he tribunal lacks the legal
authority to prosecute these crimes against humanity .... 127 The
lack of legal authority prevented judges at the tribunal from handing
down prison sentences or any definitive punishments; rather they
could merely recommended reparations, which fail to adequately
accomplish retribution.'28
The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 was not,
however, without its successes. It was the first war crimes tribunal
to focus exclusively on gender-based war crimes. 129 Perhaps most
importantly, it gave a voice to the victims who had suffered in
silence for fifty years. 30 In turn, the crimes committed against
these victims were condemned at the international level.13 1 Thus,
the tribunal was a moral victory for the victims but offered little in
terms of deterrence, retribution, or conflict resolution.
In order to ensure that gender-based war crimes are effectively
prosecuted whenever they occur, a more permanent tribunal is
necessary. Further, a permanent tribunal has the potential to deter
the overall occurrence of gender-based war crimes. Ad hoc tribunals
have made advances in recognizing and prosecuting gender-based
war crimes, but they cannot deter the initial occurrence of gender-
based war crimes. At best they can only deter continued occur-
rences. As one scholar notes:
Recognitionof rape as a serious war crime represents only the
first step in creating the deterrent necessary to combat future
impunity. Assessing the past in order to improve the effective-
ness of future prosecutions for rape warfare is imperative as
126. Chinkin, supra note 116, at 339, (quoting Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In
Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OFPEOPLES 17, 29 (James Crawford ed.,
1988)).
127. Higgins, supra note 27, at 677, 683 (2002). See also Chinkin, supra note 116, at
338 ("Lacking legal authority, was the tribunal no more than a mock trial of little
concern to serious international lawyers?").
128. See Chinkin, supra note 116, at 338-39 ("A peoples' tribunal cannot impose
sentences or order reparations, but it can make recommendations backed by the weight
of its legal findings and its moral force.").
129. Id. at 339 ("[The tribunal] focused on crimes of sexual violence and slavery,
which have been routinely erased from the official records.").
130. See Higgins, supra note 27, at 683.
131. See Chinkin, supra note 116, at 339.
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women of all ages, races, colors, creeds, and ethnicities continue
to be raped during armed conflicts. Effective prosecutions will
lead to more convictions, which will in turn translate into a legal
vindication of women's human rights in the international
community.12
A permanent tribunal could achieve the overall goal of preventing
gender-based war crimes from occurring at the outset.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The ICC was created by the Rome Statute in 1998.1 3 The Rome
Statute came into force on July 1, 2002.13 The ICC is designed to be
a permanent institution charged with criminal prosecution of war
crimes occurring during armed conflict. 13 Specifically, the ICC can
prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the
crime of aggression. 136 The ICC has complementary jurisdiction. 137
Thus, if national courts are ready, able, and competent to prosecute
war crimes, they will do so. If they are unable or unwilling to do so,
the ICC can assert jurisdiction and prosecute.'38 Furthermore, the
ICC theoretically can subject anyone who commits war crimes
132. Wood, supra note 25, at 277-78. See also Campanaro, supra note 4, at 2586
("[Tihe tribunals have limited jurisdiction, both temporally and territorially. Sexual
crimes are not confined to specific regions or committed only by certain groups. The
ability to investigate and prosecute these crimes should not be limited in such a
manner.").
133. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (2002).
134. International Criminal Court, About the Court, ICC at a Glance, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/ataglance/history.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). The Rome Statute
dictated that the ICC would enter into force sixty days after sixty states submitted
ratifying documents. Id. The sixtieth ratifying document was submitted April 11, 2002,
and the ICC's creation and jurisdiction became official and enforceable on July 1, 2002.
Id.
135. International Criminal Court, About the Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html
(last visited Jan. 25, 2006) ("The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first ever
permanent, treaty based, international criminal court established to promote the rule
of law and ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go unpunished."). See
also Hans-Peter Kaul, Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction
Site for More Justice: The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT'L
L. 370 (2005) (describing the structure and early developments of the ICC by Kaul, a
judge at the ICC).
136. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, 1, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (2002).
137. Id. art. 1 (noting that the ICC "shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions").
138. Id. arts. 1, 17. See also Karkera, supra note 33, at 210-11.
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within a state that has ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute to
its jurisdiction.139
The ICC offers several potential benefits to the incidence and
effectiveness of gender-based war crimes prosecution, but it re-
mains to be seen whether the potential benefits will translate into
results when the ICC begins trying cases. 140 Significantly, gender-
based war crimes are specifically included within the list of crimes
the ICC can prosecute.
141
Another benefit to prosecuting gender-based war crimes
established by the ICC are the protections for victims.'42 The ICC's
rules concerning how and when victims testify are purposely loose
in order to accommodate as many victims as possible without
further traumatizing them.13 The ICC also allows for victims to
139. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 1, 12, July 17, 1998,2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (2002). See also Karkera, supra note 33, at 206, 210 (noting that while the
ICC has jurisdiction over individuals, rather than states, the war crimes must have
been committed within a ratifying or acceding state).
140. See International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/cases.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). Currently, the ICC has had three
situations referred by States Parties (the Central African Republic, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Republic of Uganda) and one situation referred by the
United Nations Security Council (Darfur, Sudan). Id. Of those referrals, the ICC has
opened investigations on the DRC, the Republic of Uganda, and Darfur. Id.
141. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 6(d), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (2002) (including "[i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group" in the definition of genocide); id. art. 7, 1(g) (including "[rnape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity" in the definition of crimes against
humanity); id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii) (including "[c]ommitting rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy .... enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions" in the definition
of war crimes). See also Karkera, supra note 33, at 207-09.
Nonetheless, as the Rome Statute failed to include specific definitions of gender-based
war crimes, ascertaining how such crimes will be defined in the future will remain
unclear until the ICC begins prosecuting such crimes. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 27,
at 698 ("[I]n the International Criminal Court (ICC), murky definitions in enabling
statutes will likely hinder meaningful prosecution of gender-based war crimes.").
142. International Criminal Court, Victims and Witnesses, http://www.icc-cpi.int/
victimsissues.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006):
The victim-based provisions within the Rome Statute provide victims with
the opportunity to have their voices heard and to obtain, where appropriate,
some form of reparation for their suffering. It is this balance between retrib-
utive and restorative justice that will enable the ICC, not only to bring
criminals to justice but also to help the victims themselves obtain justice.
143. International Criminal Court, Victims and Witnesses: Participations of Victims
in Proceedings and Reparation, http://www.icc-cpi.int/victimsissues/victimsparticipation.
html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006):
For the first time in the history of international criminal justice, victims
have won the right in the Statute of the International Criminal Court to
make submissions directly, as well as through counsel, and to make
applications for reparation. This is because the victims before the two ad
hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are in fact witnesses
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have a legal representative to assist them with the process.'4 The
creators of the ICC recognized the shortcomings of the ICTY and
ICTR with respect to victims and therefore ensured that victims
were protected under the Rome Statute.'45 Overall, the Rome Statute
strives to create a court where the victims are more than mere wit-
nesses. Rather, victims are afforded a status as an integral part of
the criminal prosecution process, while also being given the protec-
tion and assistance they need to ensure that the truth comes to
light."'46 When the victims speak fully and truthfully in court, it is
more likely that justice will be effectuated and the victims will be
vindicated.
The creation of the ICC represents an important step forward
in retributive justice as well as the accomplishment of the other
goals of international criminal prosecution of gender-based war
crimes. Most importantly, the ICC is permanent147 and therefore
avoids repeated outlays of start-up capital (associated with ad hoc
tribunals) and repeated debates over rules and procedure. 14 The
existence of a court and established rules of procedure will better
facilitate the arrest and detainment of suspected war criminals. As
the ICC begins to try cases and punish war criminals, the hope is
that a precedent will be set and the rule of law will become
entrenched on the international level.' 49 Potential war criminals
will theoretically be on notice of criminal liability before any conflict
begins. 5 ° This will expand upon the deterrent effects of ad hoc
who have no independent participation in the proceedings, but are only
called on to give evidence by the parties to the proceedings.
144. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 68, 1 3, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (2002).
145. International Criminal Court, Victims and Witnesses: Victims and Witnesses Protec-
tion, httpJ/www.icc-cpi'int/victimsissues/witnessprotection.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006):
[E]xperience from... [t]ribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has
shown how crucial it is for any international criminal tribunal to arrange
for the protection and assistance of victims and witnesses that appear
before the Court so as to contribute to the establishment of truth about the
most serious crimes existing.
Furthermore, the Rome Statute "contains revolutionary conditions so far as victims
are concerned: for the first time in the history of international criminal justice, victims
can participate in a procedure, including through an intermediary of counsels, and claim
compensation; moreover, a Trust Fund in favour of victims has been created .... Id.
146. See, e.g., id.
147. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (2002).
148. See Goldstone, supra note 52, at 122 (detailing procedural difficulties that must
be overcome in the formation and implementation of a war crimes tribunal).
149. International Criminal Court, About the Court, supra note 135.
150. See Max Frankel, The War and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1995, § 6
(Magazine), at 48 (noting that a major problem at the Nuremberg tribunals was the lack
of notice in the international law context).
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tribunals because criminal prosecution and liability for gender-
based war crimes will no longer be sporadic, but rather a known
consequence that potential war criminals should consider before
acting.151
The ICC's ability to continue making progress in accomplishing
the goals of international criminal prosecution of gender-based war
crimes will be hampered by the United States' refusal to ratify the
Rome Statute or join the ICC.'52 Although the United States was
heavily involved in the creation of the Rome Statute, 53 it is one of
only seven nations to vote against it.' m Among its concerns, the
United States has reservations regarding the ICC's complementarity,
the protection of national security information, the independence of
the ICC Prosecutor, and the inclusion of the crime of aggression.'55
The United States' primary concern, however, is that American
servicemembers will be subject to the ICC's jurisdiction. 5 ' In efforts
to prevent servicemembers from coming under the ICC's jurisdiction,
151. See Akhavan, supra note 2, at 9 ('This spread [including the ICC] of account-
ability reflects the early glimmerings of an international criminal justice system and the
gradual emergence of inhibitions against massive crimes hitherto tolerated or condoned
by the international community.").
152. See Charney, supra note 77, at 460 ('If the United States and other important
states do not support the court, it will face almost insurmountable obstacles as it seeks
to prosecute persons for international crimes."). For a contrasting view, see Cara Levy
Rodriquez, Comment, Slaying the Monster: Why the United States Should Not Support
the Rome Treaty, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 805 (1999).
153. Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the
Struggle for an ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 91
(Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) ('The U.S. delegation [is] forty strong, and
easily the best prepared and most professionally disciplined at the Conference ... !).
154. Human Rights Watch, The United States and the International Criminal Court,
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icclus.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2006) (noting that the
six other countries include China, Israel, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen).
155. See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 15-17 (1999). See also Talitha Gray, Note, To Keep You Is
No Gain, to Kill You Is No Loss - Securing Justice Through the International Criminal
Court, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 645, 651-53 (2003); John R. Bolton, The United
States and the International Criminal Court, Remarks to the Federalist Society (Nov.
14, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15159.htm ('U.S. military forces
and civilian personnel and private citizens are currently active in peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions in almost 100 countries at any given time. It is essential that
we remain steadfast in preserving the independence and flexibility that America needs
to defend our national interests around the world.").
156. See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 155, at para. 3:
The United States cooperates with many other nations to keep the peace,
but we will not submit American troops to prosecutors and judges whose
jurisdiction we do not accept .... Every person who serves under the
American flag will answer to his or her own superiors and to military law,
not to the rulings of an unaccountable International Criminal Court.
(quoting President George W. Bush).
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the Bush administration has taken unprecedented steps." 7 These
actions go beyond the United States' refusal to ratify the Rome
Statute. They undercut the potential benefits and successes of the
ICC on the international level. 5 ' Impugning American service-
members diminishes the ICC's ability to act as both a general
deterrent and retributive body. In order for the ICC to establish the
rule of law with regard to criminal prosecution of gender-based war
crimes, all countries must recognize, rather than undermine, its
jurisdiction.'59
CONCLUSION
Though the full advantages of the.ICC are still speculative, the
court's potential is great, and it already offers the advantage of per-
manence. More than any other element, its permanence will promote
the incidence and effectiveness of criminal liability for gender-based
war crimes. The ICTY and ICTR have made significant progress in
setting precedents in the international prosecution of gender-based
war crimes, including convictions for rape and recognition of gender-
based war crimes as a part of overall genocide schemes. Ad hoc
international criminal tribunals have been successful in specific
deterrence, while peoples' tribunals have demonstrated their ability
to provide victim vindication. A permanent tribunal can build upon
those successes and attain the additional goals of general deter-
rence and retribution, putting the world on notice that war crimes,
including gender-based war crimes, will be prosecuted and punished
whenever and wherever they occur. 6 °
157. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the
International Criminal Court: Legal Analysis of Impunity Agreements, http://hrw.org/
campaigns/iccldocs/art98analysis.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2006). These steps include
rescinding the United States' previous signature on the Rome Statute, attempting to
secure exemptions through the United Nations for Americans on U.N. peacekeeping
missions, negotiating with other countries to create bilateral agreements to ensure
those countries would not send Americans to the ICC, and passage of the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act, which contains several specifically anti-ICC provisions.
Id. See also Juan Forero, Some Allies Find U.S. Policy Unjust, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE,
Aug. 20, 2005, at 3 (adding that the United States has also cut aid to countries that do
not agree to the bilateral agreements).
158. Human Rights Watch, supra note 157.
159. Id.
160. Nahapetian, supra note 51, at 135 ("[A]dvocates for women must continue to
press the international community to enforce international law and prosecute the rape
of all women as a crime against humanity, a war crime, or a form of genocide.").
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In turn, hopefully the ultimate goal of decreasing the occurrence
of these atrocities will be achieved. War crimes will never cease,
regardless of what international criminal prosecution mechanisms
are in place, and many war criminals will not be deterred simply
because their actions are illegal. War criminals may, however, be
deterred by the fact that criminal prosecution is now a known risk,
placing actors on notice that any power they attain will be illusory
if war crimes are committed. Nevertheless, the full achievement of
these goals will not be possible unless all countries, especially the
United States, are willing to recognize the important role the ICC
can play in achieving the goals of criminal prosecution of gender-
based war crimes.
ANDREA R. PHELPS*
* J.D. Candidate 2006, William and Mary School of Law; B.A. Political Science
2003, Colgate University, cum laude. The author would like to thank her parents for
their constant support and encouragement of everything she does and Jim for his
patience and understanding throughout this process.
